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Is Pornography an Action?: The Causal vs. the Conceptual 
View of Pornography’s Harm
In the past few decades, a new position concerning the legal 
regulation of sexually explicit materials has emerged, disrupting 
the traditional polarity between conservatives (who generally 
support regulation) and liberals (who generally oppose regula­
tion). This new position is an avowedly feminist view that supports 
the legal restriction of certain sexually explicit materials, but for 
reasons distinct from those offered by conservatives.1 The most 
prominent advocate of the feminist antipomography position is 
Catharine MacKinnon.
According to MacKinnon, some sexually explicit materials 
should be civilly restricted2 on the ground that they harm women. 
This view, as stated, is hardly original, nor is it incompatible, 
theoretically, with the traditional liberal view concerning freedom 
of speech. Liberals are, of course, willing to see some speech 
restricted if that speech can be shown to be sufficiently harmful. 
Most liberals oppose the restriction of pornography, not because 
they oppose restricting harmful speech, but because they regard 
pornography as relatively harmless. They identify the harm of 
pornography as the harm of offense and maintain that the fact that 
some find certain materials offensive is not a sufficient reason for 
restricting those materials. MacKinnon’s view, again as I have 
initially described it, is also consistent, to a point, with the 
conservative position, according to which the consumption of 
sexually explicit materials is harmful insofar as it damages the 
character or well-being of those who consume them.
What is original about MacKinnon’s view is her account of the 
harm associated with certain sexually explicit materials. First, 
unlike conservatives, she identifies this harm as a harm done to 
women generally, not a harm done to those who consume sexually 
explicit materials. Second, unlike liberals, she characterizes this
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harm as the harm of subordination, not offense. Finally, and most 
importantly, she maintains that certain sexually explicit materials 
are not only causally related to women’s subordinate status, but 
that they subordinate women in themselves. Indeed she defines 
pornography—those sexually explicit materials that she wants to 
see civilly regulated—as "the graphic, sexually explicit 
subordination of women through pictures and/or words . . .  ."3
Despite the abundance of commentary on MacKinnon’s 
position on pornography, comparatively few scholars have 
attended to the admittedly curious identification of pornography 
with subordination that we find in MacKinnon’s definition.4 The 
reason for this inattention, I suspect, is that, taken literally, the 
claim that pornography is the subordination of women seems so 
outlandish that the definition is interpreted as equivalent to the 
following: Pornography is the graphic, sexually explicit depiction 
of the subordination of women. It is clear, however, that this 
interpretation is mistaken, for MacKinnon explicitly states, "[t]he 
definition does not include all sexually explicit depictions o f  the 
subordination of women. That is not what it says. It says, this 
which does that: the sexually explicit that subordinates women."6 
For MacKinnon, then, as she puts it, "[PJomography is what it 
does, not what it says."7 Certain sexually explicit materials, in 
other words, are not forms of speech, but are actions.
This aspect of MacKinnon’s view represents a radical departure 
from the traditional approach to evaluating the harms associated 
with sexually explicit materials, which has centered around the 
causal connection between such materials, conceptualized as 
expression, and various types of harm. I will refer to this traditional 
approach as "the causal view." MacKinnon clearly endorses a 
feminist variant on this traditional theme. Throughout her work, 
she maintains that certain sexually explicit materials are causally 
related to various harms to women. I will refer to the original 
element of her view—the notion that pornography is itself an act 
of harm, and not simply causally tied to acts of harm—as "the 
conceptual view," since it defines pornography as a type of harm.
My first aim in this paper is to establish that MacKinnon’s 
argument for the conceptual view fails. In particular, I show that, 
upon examination, her purported argument for this view serves
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only to support a feminist variant of the causal argument. I argue, 
second, that a successful argument for the claim that pornography 
is an act of subordination, due to Rae Langton, does not support 
the view that pornography should fall outside of the scope of the 
First Amendment. It follows that Langton’s argument is useless to 
MacKinnon, who wants to use the claim that pornography 
subordinates women to defend exempting pornography from the 
First Amendment.81 argue, third, that MacKinnon is irrevocably 
committed to a particular, and implausible, version of the causal 
view, because only that view allows her to single out pornography 
for restriction among the vast array of presumably harmful sexist 
and misogynistic images currently available in the media. My 
discussion reveals that the antipomography feminists’ position on 
the relation between language and the world places them in a 
quandary: the more convincing their argument that pictures and 
words can, in themselves, harm, the less convincing their claim 
that pornographic pictures and words should be singled out for 
regulation.
Before presenting my arguments, I will outline the causal view, 
in its feminist incarnation, in more detail and summarize what I 
take to be a plausible account of the conceptual view. My main 
purpose is to clarify the formal difference between these two 
perspectives before setting out to argue that MacKinnon 
essentially conflates them.
The Causal View
The causal view, quite simply, asserts that there is a causal con­
nection between exposure to pornography and sexist or misogynis­
tic attitudes and behavior, such as harassment and rape. For 
example, recent studies have indicated that exposure to violent 
pornography fosters positive attitudes toward rape and other forms 
of sexual violence and that such attitudes can lead to desensitiza­
tion to sexual violence. There is also evidence that the consump­
tion of violent pornography is positively correlated with 
aggressive acts toward women.10 If one holds that the sexist 
behaviors said to be causally associated with pornography are
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constitutive of women’s subordination, then one holds a version 
of the causal view according to which pornography helps cause 
the subordination of women. As I indicated earlier, MacKinnon 
endorses the causal view in addition to advancing the conceptual 
view.11 Interestingly, though, she never states that pornography 
causes the subordination of women. She clearly holds, however, 
that pornography is causally linked to sexual violence and other 
forms of sexist and discriminatory behaviors, which are undoubt­
edly, on her view, aspects of women’s subordination.
Notice that if one misinterprets MacKinnon’s definition of 
pornography in the way that I described above, one transforms her 
account of the harm done by pornography into a somewhat bizarre 
version of the causal view according to which pornography causes 
the subordination of women by depicting the subordination of 
women.12 It is important to see that the causal view endorsed by 
MacKinnon is not the causal view created by misinterpreting her 
definition. This latter view is problematic for at least two 
reasons.13 First, the notion of depicting subordination raises some 
very difficult philosophical issues.14 Indeed, it is not exactly clear 
what it would mean for a representation to depict subordination, 
just as it is difficult to imagine what it would mean for a picture 
to depict humiliation or degradation or approbation. Second, even 
if we could identify depictions of subordination, it is obviously the 
case that not all depictions of subordination cause subordination, 
nor is it the case that all depictions that cause subordination depict 
subordination. Suppose for the sake of argument that a depiction 
of a woman being raped is also a depiction of a woman being 
subordinated. Such a depiction occurring, say, in a feminist 
documentary about sexual violence, though it, ex hypothesi, 
depicts subordination, is not likely to be causally related to 
women’s subordination. Suppose, furthermore, that a portrayal of 
a woman copulating, apparently voluntarily, with a dog does not 
portray her being subordinated. A portrayal of this sort, though it 
again, ex hypothesi, does not portray subordination, may be 
causally related to women’s subordinate status. What I am calling 
the causal view does not entail the problematic view that I just 
described according to which pornography subordinates women 
primarily by depicting the subordination of women.
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At first glance, the conceptual view—the view that pornography 
itself subordinates women—may appear as nothing more than 
conceptual confusion or perhaps a sleight of hand designed to 
preempt opposition.15 What follows is a summary of a defense of 
the claim that pornography subordinates women that shows these 
suspicions to be unfounded.
MacKinnon characterizes subordination as putting someone in 
a position of inferiority or loss of power or demeaning or 
denigrating them.16 The question is whether or not pornography 
can do that to women. Drawing upon the work of J.L. Austin, Rae 
Langton makes a convincing case that it can. She argues first that 
speech acts can in principle subordinate and second that 
pornographic speech acts may subordinate women. Let us 
consider first Austin’s general account of speech acts. When we 
say something, Austin claims, we also do something, and in the 
case of some utterances what we do when we make them is more 
significant than what we express. These utterances he calls 
"performatives."17 Examples of performatives include saying "I 
do" in the course of a marriage ceremony, saying "Look out for 
the potted plants" or exclaiming "Go to your room!"18 Besides 
using sentences to describe the world, state facts, or express ideas, 
we also use them to marry, to warn, or to order.
Performatives, like other speech acts, are comprised of three 
separate (but simultaneous) acts. These are labeled by Austin, the 
locutionary, the perlocutionary, and the illocutionary act. The 
locutionary act "includes the utterance of certain noises, the 
utterance of certain words in a certain construction, and the 
utterance of them with a certain ‘meaning’ in the favourite 
philosophical sense of that word, i.e., with a certain sense and with 
a certain reference."19 The perlocutionary act is the act of 
"produc[ing] certain consequential effects upon the feelings, 
thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker or of other 
persons . . .  ."20 Finally, the illocutionary act is the act of using a 
locution to do something; it refers to the function of an utterance. 
The acts mentioned above—marrying, warning, and ordering—all 
count as illocutions. To better understand these three kinds of
The Conceptual View
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actions, let us consider the following example from Austin, which 
has been embellished by Langton:
Two men stand beside a woman. The first man turns to the second, and says 
"Shoot her." The second man looks shocked, then raises a gun and shoots the 
woman. You witness the scene and describe it later.
On one level of description, what happened was that a man said 
to another man, "Shoot her," meaning by "shoot" to fire a gun and 
referring by "her" to the woman standing nearby. This description 
is of the locutionary act. At another level of description, the first 
man, by saying something, shocked the second man and persuaded 
him to shoot the woman. This description concerns the effects of 
the utterance and so is of the perlocutionary act. At yet another 
level of description, the first man, in saying "Shoot her," urged, or 
perhaps ordered, the second man to fire a gun at the woman. This 
description captures the illocutionary act.
An important feature of illocutionary acts is that they are 
conventional.23 For instance, the illocutionary act of pronouncing 
a verdict depends upon the conventions of the legal system. 
Though I might assert "O.J. Simpson is guilty," I am not, in so 
doing, pronouncing a verdict. A similar locutionary act, however, 
performed by the foreperson of a jury, would have the illocutionary 
force of pronouncing a verdict. Though there are many elements 
of convention involved in illocutionary acts, this example reveals 
that some illocutionary acts require that the person performing the 
locution be in a position of authority. I emphasize this particular 
point about illocutionary acts because, as we will see, it is relevant 
to the question of whether pornography can subordinate women.24
Langton argues that subordinating can be an illocutionary act. 
The locution "whites only," she says, borrowing an example from 
MacKinnon, is not only the perlocutionary act of keeping blacks 
away from certain areas, perpetuating racism, and so on, but is also 
the illocutionary act of ranking blacks as inferior, legitimating 
discriminatory behavior toward blacks and depriving them of cer­
tain powers.2 Hence it is an illocutionary act of subordination.26
If speech acts can in principle subordinate, then perhaps 
pornography, as a speech act, can subordinate women. Since it is 
arguable that pornography ranks women as sex objects and
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legitimates or authorizes sexual violence against women, then it 
seems reasonable to say that it has the illocutionary force of 
subordination.27 There is, however, hardly a consensus on the illo­
cutionary force of pornography. Pornography is a kind of locution 
for which it is difficult to determine precisely its illocutionary 
force.28 There exists a constellation of issues both interpretive and 
epistemological involved in ascribing the correct illocutionary 
force to a speech act. Langton maintains, and I agree, that the 
central issue in determining whether or not pornography is an 
illocutionary act that subordinates women involves the problem 
of authority. If, with MacKinnon, we regard pomographer’s 
speech not as the speech of a vulnerable minority, but as the speech 
of a powerful and influential group that represents the interests of 
the dominant culture, then pornographic speech is, at least for 
some populations, authoritative. Its verdicts about the worth and 
appropriate treatment of women count. If this is the case, then 
pornography may have the illocutionary force of subordination.’29
We have so far been familiarized with both the causal and 
conceptual views of the harm associated with pornography. I am 
not so much concerned at this point with the merits of these views, 
but rather with getting clear on their content and the difference 
between them. The causal view, recall, simply states that there is 
a causal connection between pornographic depictions and harm to 
women. One form of this view states that pornography causes the 
subordination of women by causing the acts and values that 
comprise a system of male dominance. In Austin’s terminology, 
this causal view states that pornography is a perlocutionary act of 
subordination. The conceptual view, as reconstructed by Langton, 
holds that, on the assumption that pornographic speech is suf­
ficiently authoritative, it is an illocutionary act of subordination. 
Pornographic speech itself, on this account, subordinates women 
by ranking women as inferior to men and legitimating acts of 
violence and discrimination against us. As such, pornography is 
directly implicated in women’s diminished moral and civil status.
Let me add one more complication before I move on to 
MacKinnon’s position. Although the perlocutionary and illocu­
tionary acts of a speech act are conceptually distinct, they may be 
empirically linked. An utterance may be the perlocutionary act that
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it is, in virtue of being the illocutionary act that it is. Consider 
Langton’s example of the utterance "whites only." One of the 
effects of utterances of this sort, she claims, is that they perpetuate 
racist attitudes and conduct. One reason for this might be that they 
are illocutionary acts of ranking blacks as inferior?0 As Langton 
puts it, a speech act’s effects might be best explained by attributing 
to it a certain illocutionary force.31 Part of the explanation for the 
occurrence of racist actions, to continue the example, might be that 
blacks are publicly ranked, by signs saying "whites only," as 
inferior to whites. It follows that the sexist attitudes and actions to 
which women are subjected may be partly explained by the fact 
that pornography sanctions and legitimates them.
MacKinnon’s View
I begin my exposition of MacKinnon’s argument that pornography 
is an action, rather than a form of expression, by discussing her 
latest work, Only Words. In this work, she strongly suggests the 
view that pornography is an illocutionary act of subordination.32 
What I will show is that she fails to substantiate that view. Indeed, 
her defense of it is actually a defense of the causal view. After 
discussing the position she outlines in Only Words, I will assess 
some of her earlier work where her account of the notion that 
pornography is an action differs slightly from the one offered in 
Only Words. Her earlier argument, I maintain, is also a causal 
account, albeit one that contains a different emphasis from the 
view expressed in her latest work.
The overall structure of the first chapter of Only Words, which 
is devoted to pornography, is as follows: MacKinnon maintains, 
at the outset, that pornographic speech is analogous to a variety of 
speech acts that are unproblematically regarded as performatives. 
Since these speech acts are seen by the law as actions rather than 
forms of expression, and as consequently beyond the reach of the 
First Amendment, then, she claims, pornography too should be 
regarded as an action and as beyond the reach of the First 
Amendment.33 Her justification, as we will see, consists in 
arguing that (a) harmful and coerced actions are often necessary
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to produce pornography, (b) consuming pornography often 
involves an act, and (c) men who consume pornography act to hurt 
women. "[S]ocial life," MacKinnon observes, "is full of words that 
are legally treated as the acts they constitute without so much as 
a whimper from the First Amendment."34 Many of these speech 
acts are prohibited by law because they constitute discrimination. 
Examples include "‘help wanted—male’, ‘sleep with me and I’ll 
give you an A’, ‘fuck me or you’re fired’, . . .  and ‘it was essential 
that the understudy to my Administrative Assistant be a man’."35 
"Social inequality," she continues,
is substantially created and enforced—that is, done—through words and im­
ages. Social hierarchy cannot and does not exist without being embodied in 
meanings and expressed in communications." . . . .  [Authoritatively saying 
someone is inferior is largely how structures of status and differential treatment 
are demarcated and actualized. Words and images are how people are placed in 
hierarchies, how social stratification is made to seem inevitable and right__
To illustrate this perspective, she relates the by now familiar 
example of a sign stating "White Only":
A sign saying "White Only" is only words, but it is not legally seen as expressing 
the viewpoint "we do not want black people in this store," or as dissenting from 
the policy view that both blacks and whites must be served, or even as hate 
speech . . .  It is seen as the act of segregation that it is . . .  Segregation cannot 
happen without saying "get out" or "you don’t belong here" at some point. 
Elevation and denigration are all accomplished through meaningful symbols 
and communicative acts in which saying it is also doing it.
Pornography, MacKinnon reminds us, is not typically seen as 
an act of this sort, but is seen as speech. It is therefore regarded as 
deserving of First Amendment protection, at least prima facie. On 
this view of pornography, she tells us:
[I]t is conceived in terms of what it says, which is imagined more or less effective 
or harmful as someone then acts on it, rather than in terms of what it does. 
Fundamentally, in this view, a form of communication cannot, as such, do 
anything bad except offend. Offense is all in the head. Because the purveyor is 
protected in sending, and the consumer in receiving, the thought or feeling, the 
fact that an unintended bystander might have offended thoughts or unpleasant 
feelings is a mere externality, a cost we must pay for freedom. That the First 
Amendment protects this process of interchange—thought to thought, feeling 
to feeling—there is no doubt.
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This approach, according to MacKinnon, is seriously mistaken. 
"Pornography," she claims,
contains ideas, like any other social practice. But the way it works is not as a 
thought or through its ideas as such, at least not in the way thoughts and ideas 
are protected as speech. Its place in abuse requires understanding it more in 
active than in passive terms, as constructing and performative rather than as 
merely referential or connotative.
Finally she tells us what precisely pornography does such that it 
should be regarded as an action that helps constitute the social 
inequality between women and men: it "subordinates] women 
through sex."41
These passages contain the following line of reasoning:
(1) Plenty of speech acts that help constitute unjustified 
inequality are regarded, generally and by the law, as actions and 
not speech. In Austin’s terms, certain speech acts are recognized 
as performatives whose illocutionary force is a kind of harm, for 
instance, the harm of segregation or of the illegitimate curtailment 
of rights.
(2) In traditional legal theory, the harm of pornography has been 
conceived as causal. In particular, pornography has been viewed 
as possibly causing offense and perhaps as sometimes causing 
individuals exposed to it to engage in acts of harm. Again, in 
Austin’s terms, pornography has been conceptualized chiefly as a 
perlocutionary act of offense. It has also perhaps been 
acknowledged to be a perlocutionary act that occasionally 
persuades or convinces men to harm women.
(3) If it is correct to see pornography as a form of expression 
that may cause offense or even physical harm (provided that the 
harm is rare and tends to occur only under unusual 
circumstances),42 then it is rightfully protected by the First 
Amendment. That is, if pornography is best regarded in terms of 
its perlocutionary dimension, so long as its effects are not too 
drastic or extensive, then it deserves First Amendment protection.
(4) However, pornography should not be conceived for legal 
purposes as speech. Because of the way it contributes to women’s 
diminished social status, it should be seen as an action. In other
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words, pornography should not be regarded chiefly as a perlocu­
tionary act, but rather as an illocutionary act of subordination 
capable of creating inequality between women and men.
If my reconstruction is correct, MacKinnon is claiming, first, 
that if the harm of pornography is exclusively causal, and if that 
harm consists primarily in offense, then pornography is rightly 
regarded as a form of speech that falls within the scope of the First 
Amendment. Second, she is asserting that the harm of pornog­
raphy is not exclusively causal and that its harms extend beyond 
offense. Pornography, MacKinnon claims in these passages, is a 
performative that has the illocutionary force of subordination. 
How does she support this view? First, she maintains that certain 
harmful actions are often performed in order to produce 
pornography. Some women are blackmailed and physically 
intimidated into making it.43 And, in that making they may be 
physically hurt, sometimes brutally, as the testimony of Linda 
Marchiano graphically documents. And even when women are 
not directly coerced or physically abused in the making of 
pornography, their decisions to participate are not wholly 
voluntary because they are made in a context of inequality based 
on sex. Often those who participate in the production of pornog­
raphy, MacKinnon maintains, are "poor, desperate, homeless, 
pimped women who were sexually abused as children."45 We can, 
of course, recognize the severity of these circumstances without 
assenting to the plainly false assertion that pornography is an 
action because actions are required to make it. Actions are required 
to make a cake too, but that does not make a cake an action.
The second way that MacKinnon attempts to support the view 
that pornography is an action involves a similarly glaring non 
sequitur: "Pornography is masturbation material. It is used as sex. 
It therefore is sex." 6 That pornography is used in certain actions, 
however, does not make it the case that pornography is an action. 
Cakes are used in the act of eating, yet are clearly not, on that basis, 
themselves actions.
Finally, MacKinnon maintains that pornography is an action 
because it causes harmful acts. As I mentioned above, besides es­
pousing the conceptual view, MacKinnon also explicitly endorses
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the causal view. She maintains that pornography is causally related 
to acts of sexism and violence against women. So, we should not 
be surprised to find passages in her work that support the causal 
thesis. Problems arise, however, when it is clear that she is 
invoking the causal thesis to support her claim that pornography 
itself is an action. For instance, after asserting that the liberal view 
of pornography mistakenly conceives of it as ideas rather than acts, 
she says: "it is not the ideas in pornography that assault women: 
men do, men who are made, changed, and impelled by it."47 She 
also states:
Sooner or later, in one way or another, the consumers want to live out the 
pornography further in three dimensions. Sooner or later, in one way or another, 
they do. It makes them want to-when they believe they can, when they feel they 
can get away with it, they do.
Where MacKinnon is here unmistakably appealing to the causal 
view, elsewhere she endeavors to defend the view that pornog­
raphy is an action by obscuring the fact that she is invoking the 
causal picture. For instance, she asks us to consider the following:
Suppose that the sexually explicit has a content element: it contains a penis 
ramming into a vagina. Does that mean that a picture of this conveys the idea 
of a penis ramming into a vagina, or does the viewer see and experience a penis 
ramming into a vagina? If a man watches a penis ram into a vagina live, in the 
flesh, do we say he is watching the idea of a penis ramming into a vagina? How 
is the visual pornography different? When he then goes and rams his penis into 
a woman’s vagina, is that because he has an idea, or because he has an 
erection?
Basically, what MacKinnon is trying to do in this passage is to 
break down the distinction between a depiction of an act and the 
act depicted. She is claiming that when it comes to pornography, 
the distinction between a depiction of an action and the action itself 
is irrelevant. Why is it irrelevant? Because both the action itself 
and the visual representation of the action share an important 
feature: they are both capable of eliciting a sexual response. What 
is important about pornography, she is claiming, is not that it 
conveys ideas, but that it, like the actions it portrays, sexually 
arouses. Pornography, that is, does not simply or typically or 
essentially relate propositions but rather causes sexual arousal. It
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may thereby prompt its users to engage in actions similar to those 
it endorses. The fact that pornography causes sexual arousal and 
may thereby prompt individuals to act, however, does not make 
pornography itself an act.
MacKinnon strongly suggests, by her analogies and by her 
account of the connection between speech acts and social 
inequality, that pornography is a performative: an action that has 
the illocutionary force of discrimination and subordination. On 
this ground, she maintains, it should not be protected by the First 
Amendment. Her argument for this claim consists in a discussion 
of the variety of actions that are associated with pornography: the 
actions necessary to produce it, the action in which it is often 
implicated, and the actions it sometimes causes. Her discussion of 
the last of these makes some headway against the liberal view she 
opposes, for that view sees the harm of pornography as consisting 
primarily in offense. If the effects of pornography extend 
considerably beyond offense to assault and harassment, as she 
claims, then clearly liberals will have to reassess their position. 
Nonetheless, in identifying the detrimental effects of pornography, 
MacKinnon has not succeeded in removing the pornography issue 
from its traditional home within the causal framework. Rather, she 
has utilized that framework to argue for the restriction of 
pornography.
Pornography and the Social Construction of Women
As we have seen in Only Words, MacKinnon advances the view 
that pornography ought to be regarded in terms of its illocutionary 
force, rather than as a locutionary act. She emphasizes, however, 
in her support of this notion, pornography’s perlocutionary dimen­
sion; she relates the effects that pornography has upon men’s 
attitudes and behavior toward women. This emphasis reflects a 
shift from her earlier work, where she was primarily concerned to 
demonstrate the effect on women of living in a culture saturated 
with pornography.
In her earlier writings, MacKinnon claims that pornography is 
vital to the maintenance of male supremacy because it aids in the
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constructing of social reality, in particular the institutions of 
sexuality and gender, in a way that promotes the interests and 
power of men. Pornography, she states, is a major vehicle for 
defining what women are. At the same time, it presents itself as a 
mere reflection or representation of social reality, rather than as a 
factor in its construction. She states:
[Pornography] institutionalizes the sexuality of male supremacy, fusing the 
erotization of dominance and submission with the social construction of male 
and female. To the extent that gender is sexual, pornography is part of consti­
tuting the meaning of that sexuality. Men treat women as who they see women 
as being. Pornography constructs who that is. Men’s power over women means 
that the way men see women defines who women can be .. . .  Pornography is 
not imagery in some relation to a reality elsewhere constructed. It is not a 
distortion, reflection, projection, expression, fantasy, representation, or symbol 
either. It is sexual reality.
The definition of women that pornography provides and enacts is 
one according to which, by nature, women
. . .  desire dispossession and cruelty. We desperately want to be bound, battered, 
tortured, humiliated, and killed. Or, to be fair to the soft-core, merely taken and 
used.. . .  Subjection itself, with self-determination ecstatically relinquished, is 
the content of women’s sexual desire and desirability. Women are there to be 
violated and possessed, men to violate and possess us . . . .
By sexualizing this conception of women, pornography endorses 
and legitimates it;52 it makes the dynamic of male dominance and 
female submission sexy.53 It thereby helps to construct women as 
beings that are subordinate to men.
It is the power of pornography to define what women are, 
through both its message and the process by which that message 
is conveyed, that on MacKinnon’s earlier view makes pornog­
raphy an action. It is an action, she thinks, because it helps create 
social reality.54 The message of pornography is that women are 
mere objects to be used or beings whom it is legitimate to violate 
and harm. The process that conveys this message is the process of 
erotization. This process, MacKinnon believes, is a very effective 
means of authorizing and promoting what pornography depicts.
MacKinnon distinguishes this social construction account of the 
harm done to women by pornography from the standard causal
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view of harm embedded in most legal reasoning.55 The social 
construction view, nonetheless, is a causal account o f 
pornography’s harm: it identifies pornography as a major cause of 
the misogynistic views prevalent in our culture and as, therefore, 
a major cause of the sexist actions produced by such attitudes. 
Indeed, MacKinnon herself describes the social construction view 
as causal in a special sense.57
She sees the standard causal view as overly narrow, since it 
recognizes as harm only those acts perpetrated by individual men 
against individual women. On the standard view, a woman has not 
been harmed by pornography unless a particular action occurs 
(say, a rape) that can be traced directly to a particular person who 
has consumed a particular piece of pornography that depicts the 
act that he performed and it is clear that the depiction moved him 
to perform it. (The "Long Dong Silver" incident described during 
the confirmation hearings for Clarence Thomas may be an 
example of this kind of harm. An individual man was impelled to 
sexually harass an individual woman, presumably, in part as a 
consequence of consuming a particular and specifiable piece of 
pornography.) What the narrow causal view overlooks, and what 
the social construction view takes into account, MacKinnon 
claims, is the "more complex causality" involved in the process 
by which pornography defines women as beings who are 
subordinate to men. It overlooks the role of pornography in 
creating the norms of sex and sexuality and the imperatives of 
gender so as to create a hierarchy wherein women are socially 
located beneath men.58
So far we have seen four ways in which pornography is said by 
MacKinnon to be an action: (1) actions are often involved in its 
making, (2) it is sometimes used in the performing of an action,
(3) it is causally connected to some individual acts of harm to 
women, and (4) it is causally linked to the social definition of 
women as beings who are inferior to men. I have argued that, while 
these various assertions about pornography may be true, none of 
them works as a defense of the idea that pornography itself is an 
action. MacKinnon’s account of the relationship between 
pornography and "reality," as she puts it, is at times original and
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insightful, and of course also open to objection. Yet her attempt to 
move beyond the causal framework is not successful.
Pornography as Conditioning
Despite her warning that confining our view of causality to the 
doctrine expressed by the standard view will make us overlook 
much of the harm created by pornography, MacKinnon reminds 
us that even by the standards of the standard view, pornography 
causes harm to women. There is a direct and discernible causal 
link, MacKinnon tells us, between individual men’s use of por­
nography and their tendency to hurt women. In Only Words, her 
account of this causal connection takes on an unmistakably behav­
ioristic cast. MacKinnon’s resort to behaviorism, I will argue, is 
motivated by two concerns. First, it allows her to explain in more 
specific terms how it is that pornography can have the immense 
constructive power she attributes to it in her earlier work. She is 
concerned to show, that is, precisely what the mechanism is that 
enables pornographic depictions to have the defining influence 
that she claims they have. Second, her behavioristic account 
enables her to explain why, among all the sexist and misogynistic 
representations that exist, only pornography has such immense 
constructive power. She needs to make this case, of course, in order 
to justify restricting pornography but not other sexist speech acts.
MacKinnon’s account, in Only Words, of the causal process that 
links pornographic images to male behavior is as follows:
Pornography, not its ideas as such, . . . gives men erections that support 
aggression against women in particular. [Some who use it] . . . are sexually 
habituated to its kick, a process that is largely unconscious and works as 
primitive conditioning, with pictures and words as sexual stimuli. . .  . [Por­
nography represents]. . .  unconscious mental intrusion and physical manipula­
tion. . . .  [Its] message is addressed directly to the penis, delivered through an 
erection, and token out on women in the real world.
As these passages suggest, MacKinnon sees the process whereby 
men view women being harmed or objectified in a context that is 
sexual and which often involves arousal and orgasm on the part of
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the viewers as having a significant impact on their attitudes and 
behavior. She says:
With pornography, men masturbate to women being exposed, humiliated, 
violated, degraded, mutilated, dismembered, bound, gagged, tortured and killed. 
In the visual materials, they experience this being done by watching it being 
done. What is real here is not that the materials are pictures, but that they are 
part of a sex act. The women are in two dimensions, but the men have sex with 
them in their own three-dimensional bodies, not in their minds alone.
The association of the subjection of women with sexual response 
and pleasure, MacKinnon holds, creates and fortifies contempt for 
women in the minds of men and hence prompts them to treat 
women in sexist and misogynistic ways.
Her earlier work left somewhat unclear the mechanism by 
which pornography functions to define and construct women. 
There she relies on the vague notion of "erotization" or "sexualiza- 
tion." While one can see how erotizing something may put a 
positive spin on it, it is unclear as to why this particular method of 
promoting a certain view or message can have such a uniquely 
strong ideological impact. The behavioristic model, which holds 
that men are conditioned through the use of pornography to regard 
and treat women as inferior objects, serves as an explanation of 
the extensive influence MacKinnon attributes to pornography. It 
explains, that is, why men so often, in her view, come to see women 
in the way that pornography presents us. If pornography operated 
at only the rational level, or at the level of "ideas," as she puts it, 
men would be much more immune to its message.
The behavioristic model also allows MacKinnon to isolate 
pornography from other media that contain misogynistic or sexist 
images of women. This move, as I stated earlier, is crucial to her 
desire to see pornography—but not other images that might 
arguably subordinate women—restricted. She observes that the 
content of pornography is not unique: "[t]here are many ways to 
say what pornography says, in the sense of its content. But nothing 
else does what pornography does."63 The reason for this is that 
pornography functions as masturbation material. As such, it "does 
not engage the conscious mind in the chosen way the model of 
‘content,’ in terms of which it is largely defended, envisions and
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requires."64 Of course, theoretically, just about anything can 
function as masturbation material, and hence "not engage the con­
scious mind." But pornography combines a particularly damaging 
and invidious message with a particularly potent method of con­
veyance. And, as sexually explicit, and hence sexually arousing, 
it is more likely than other images to be used in masturbation. 
Therefore, pornography is, among other sexist images, on 
MacKinnon’s reasoning, especially critical to the construction of 
gender and sexuality in ways that help constitute male dominance.
At this point we are in a position to piece together MacKinnon’s 
overall account—one that spans her earlier and later works—of 
pornography’s role in the subordination of women. It works by 
portraying, sexually explicitly and in an endorsing context, 
women being harmed, or women whose agency has been erased 
or reduced to a slavish desire to please men sexually. In essence, 
it portrays women as less than full persons and as, therefore, 
diminished in status relative to men. These depictions engender 
sexual arousal and are used for masturbation. The act of masturba­
tion implants in the minds of men, the view of women presented 
in the pornography. The view so implanted and the actions that 
may ensue from it—from sexist remarks, to leering, to gang 
rape—help structure and enforce a system of male supremacy.
Despite its complexity, and regardless of its plausibility, this 
account does not establish that pornography is an action. Rather, 
it describes a complex causal process tracing the various links 
between sexually explicit, misogynistic images on the one hand 
and social practices and institutions on the other. Its behavioristic 
component, I have argued, serves to support the notion that 
pornography, among a wide variety of sexist images and texts, is 
especially definitive in the social construction of women and that 
therefore pornography, among a wide variety of sexist practices 
and ideologies, is central to the maintenance of male dominance.
Pornography, Speech Acts, and The First Amendment
Earlier, I claimed that Langton outlines what is arguably a plausi­
ble version of the conceptual view. If I am right that MacKinnon’s
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defense of the conceptual view is inadequate, it seems natural to 
inquire whether Langton’s view can serve MacKinnon’s purposes. 
In what follows, I argue that it cannot, because Langton’s view 
does not support the speech-action distinction in a way that would 
justify placing pornography beyond the reach of the First Amend­
ment.
As a preliminary point, we must note that in showing that 
pornography is an illocutionary act, Langton has not shown, nor 
does she intend to, that it is an act as opposed to a form of 
expression. All speech acts are illocutionary acts. As Austin states, 
"[t]o perform a locutionary act is in general. .  . also and eo ipso 
to perform an illocutionary act . . . ,"65 Speech acts that are 
ordinarily regarded as speech and not actions have illocutionary 
force. For example, stating is an illocutionary act.66 Therefore, 
MacKinnon would not be aided in her effort to establish that 
pornography, unlike other utterances, is an action by showing that 
it is an illocutionary act. But recall that Austin was especially 
interested in certain kinds of utterances which he called 
"performatives." These are speech acts that seem to be more 
act-like than speech-like; they are actions done with words. The 
examples considered above included such things as warning, 
marrying, ordering, and pronouncing a verdict. As we saw earlier, 
though MacKinnon asserts that pornography is on a par with some 
harmful performatives, such as bribery, collusion, and segregation, 
she does not successfully argue for that claim.
Nor does Langton argue directly for the claim that pornography 
is a performative. In the course of her argument that pornography 
is an illocutionary act of subordination, however, she compares 
pornography to a speech act that arguably is a performative—the 
utterance "whites only." Langton’s strategy of using a performa­
tive to illustrate how an utterance can have the illocutionary force 
of subordination raises the following question: Is "whites only" a 
performative because it has the illocutionary force of sub­
ordination? Or, more generally, are speech acts appropriately 
classed performatives depending upon what in particular their 
illocutionary force is? If the answer is "yes," then showing that 
pornography subordinates may be tantamount to showing that it 
is a performative, which, in ton, may be a way of distinguishing
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it from other utterances as an action. Furthermore, if pornography 
is an action, then the issue of its restriction, as MacKinnon main­
tains, should not be adjudicated within a First Amendment frame­
work.67 Hence, if pornography is a performative, then it may be 
permissible to restrict it without violating the First Amendment. 
To find out how to identify performatives as such, we must turn 
to Austin.
Austin distinguishes at the outset of How to Do Things With 
Words between "performatives" and "constantives." The latter are 
everyday sorts of statements that can have a truth value and that 
are generally used to describe the world or state facts. The former, 
by contrast, are not typically true or false, nor are they normally 
regarded as saying something. Instead, they are regarded as doing 
something. The issuing of the utterance is the performing of an 
action.68 Notably, the rest of Austin’s book is basically devoted to 
undermining this original distinction. Indeed, he discovers that the 
task of identifying a set of expressly performative verbs that would 
allow us unambiguously to distinguish performatives from 
constantives is futile. What he originally identified as 
paradigmatic examples of performatives are not such because of 
the kind of illocutionary acts they are—marrying as opposed to 
merely stating, for example—but because their illocutionary 
dimension seems more salient. Austin says:
With the constantive utterance, we abstract from the illocutionary ..  . aspects 
of the speech act, and we concentrate on the locutionary . . . .  With the 
performative utterance, we attend as much as possible to the illocutionary force 
of the utterance. . . .
In short, the difference between constantives and performatives is 
not a difference in kind.
Because his initial distinction proved so problematic, Austin 
abandoned it in the end in favor of a five-fold classificatory scheme 
that groups together speech acts having a similar illocutionary 
component. Some of these categories contain speech acts that we 
are likely to regard in terms of their illocutionary force, and so are 
likely to treat as actions. The category "exercitives" is an example. 
It encompasses utterances that represent "the exercising of powers, 
rights or influence" including "appointing, voting, ordering,
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urging, advising, warning, etc."7 Other categories contain speech 
acts whose illocutionary element we normally overlook in favor 
of their locutionary element. These are speech acts that we 
generally regard as speech. They include describing, mentioning, 
telling, stating, and remarking.
It follows from these considerations that by showing that an 
utterance has the illocutionary force of subordination one has not 
shown that it is a performative. The very category "performatives," 
Austin found, dissolves under scrutiny. Hence, showing that 
pornography has the illocutionary force of subordination does not 
distinguish it as an action from other forms of expression. Words 
that subordinate, insofar as they are illocutionary acts, are no more 
actions than are words that describe. Indeed, images that 
subordinate are no more actions than are images that simply 
depict, for depicting is also an illocutionary act. Consequently, 
even if one grants that pornography is comparable to the kinds of 
speech acts that Austin thought of as paradigmatically performa­
tive, one has not shown that pornography is different in kind from 
other sorts of speech acts; Langton’s account of the way in which 
pornography is an action is not useful to MacKinnon, because 
Langton’s view entails, as did Austin’s, that all utterances are 
actions. Hence Langton’s account does not support MacKinnon’s 
claim that pornography’s status as an act of subordination dif­
ferentiates it from other harmful utterances, such as hate speech,72 
which are forms of expression. Consequently it does not support 
her claim that pornography, as a harmful action, should be beyond 
the reach of the First Amendment.
Perhaps one can argue, however, that pornography should be 
restricted, not because it is metaphysically different from other 
utterances, but because it is normatively different. While all utter­
ances are illocutionary acts, one might grant, the fact that the 
illocutionary act that pornography is is the act of subordinating 
women warrants its exclusion from First Amendment coverage. 
The defect of this position becomes apparent when one observes 
that Langton’s argument for the claim that pornography is an illo­
cutionary act of subordination does not depend upon the fact that 
pornography is Sexually explicit. Many non-sexually explicit 
speech acts that arguably have the illocutionary force of
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subordination are generally regarded as rightfully protected by the 
First Amendment. 3 They include billboards, music videos, films, 
television commercials, religious texts, and so on. Surely if por­
nography subordinates women by authoritatively ranking us as in­
ferior to men and by legitimating sexist and misogynistic beha­
viors, then many of these other utterances subordinate us as well.74
Because a whole host of non-sexually explicit utterances are 
illocutionary acts of subordination (if any are), MacKinnon must 
give prominence to the behavioristic account of the impact of 
pornography presented in her latest work. She cannot argue that 
pornography should be exempt from the First Amendment simply 
because it subordinates women, for this view would commit her 
\  *
to endorsing the restriction of a wide range of speech acts. She 
needs an argument for restricting sexually explicit subordinating 
speech acts. The behavioristic model, as we saw above, by 
claiming that pornography, in virtue of being sexually explicit, has 
a particularly powerful effect on the attitudes of its consumers, 
permits MacKinnon to single out pornography, among sub­
ordinating speech acts, as especially harmful. But notice that this 
move completely obviates the need for establishing that 
pornography is an illocutionary act of subordination. The claim 
that does the work in the argument is the claim that pornography, 
as a form of conditioning, is capable of inducing men to engage in 
acts of harm toward women. That pornography may subordinate 
women by assigning to us an inferior status relative to men is 
rendered, by the behavioristic approach, immaterial. And, once 
again, the debate about pornography’s regulation is shifted to the 
issue of its causal relation to harm.
Problems with the Conditioning Theory
We began with an examination of the metaphysics of the speech- 
action distinction as expressed in the work of MacKinnon. I argued 
that her defense of the notion that pornography should be seen as 
an action is unsatisfactory because, at every turn, she equates 
pornography with actions associated causally with it. I also argued 
that attempting to differentiate between speech and action meta­
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physically with a view to shedding some light on the issue of 
pornography’s eligibility for First Amendment protection is not a 
productive strategy. It turns out that any reasonable argument for 
the claim that pornography is an action is also an argument that 
all forms of speech are actions. Furthermore, if one grants that all 
utterances are actions, insofar as they are illocutionary acts, but 
claims that pornography should be regulated because of the kind 
of illocutionary act it is, namely the act of subordination, one is 
singling out pornography arbitrarily. Many utterances that are 
illocutionary acts of subordination are not sexually explicit. If sub­
ordinating speech acts should be restricted qua subordinating, then 
non-sexually explicit subordinating speech acts should be re­
stricted. Assuming that one does not want to cast one’s net that 
wide, one must, as MacKinnon does, shift one’s argument to causal 
grounds. The causal considerations that MacKinnon attempts to 
motivate, however, seem somewhat far-fetched, for two reasons.75
First, it seems implausible that repeatedly experiencing sexual 
arousal and orgasm while viewing women in demeaning poses is 
any more potent a force for shaping attitudes than is, say, 
repeatedly attending certain Christian church services and 
studying the Scriptures. The image of women conveyed by 
Christianity is as dangerous and as damaging as that presented by 
pornography: women are said to exist to serve men, to bear "their" 
children, our sexuality is seen as dangerous and in need of control, 
our bodies as mysterious and filthy. Furthermore, religious 
convictions tend to be inculcated in nonrational ways and are often 
experienced by the devout as deeply emotional. And, the 
pronouncements of Christianity concerning women’s nature and 
our appropriate role are issued from a source regarded by many to 
be the highest authority. Religious speech, in short, like 
pornographic speech, operates largely at a nonrational level, 
conveys, blatantly and subtly, contempt for women, and is, for 
many, authoritative.
My second worry relates to the issue of the direction of 
causation. One cannot help but wonder why some men are so 
intensely attracted to and moved by pornographic images while 
others are less so or not at all. That is, why are some men, to use 
MacKinnon’s words, "habituated to its kick"? It seems that one’s
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prior attitudes toward women and sexuality will be a determining 
factor in one’s choice to use pornography. If this is the case, then 
pornography does not have the far-reaching constructive influence 
that MacKinnon attributes to it. Instead, it caters to a set of sexist 
values, beliefs, and attitudes already held by its consumers. It 
exerts whatever influence it has, then, primarily on those 
individuals predisposed to be drawn by its message.
The most serious implication of the feminist antipomography 
position takes the form of a dilemma: on the one hand, the feminist 
antipomography view provides grounds for believing that 
pornography contributes to the oppression of women, both by 
subordinating us directly (as an illocutionary act) and by helping 
to cause our subordinate status (by influencing people’s attitudes 
and actions). These considerations lend support to the notion that 
pornography ought to be civilly restricted. On the other hand, if 
words and images have the power to construct and impose social 
inequality that antipomography feminists claim they do, it follows 
that a whole assortment of images and texts, and not just 
pornography, is implicated in women’s inequality. Hence it 
follows that a whole assortment of texts and images, and not just 
pornography, should be civilly restricted, antipomography 
fem inists have, in a sense, created for themselves a paradox: the 
more compelling their account of the .metaphysical impact of 
images and words, the less compelling their argument for 
restricting pornography. Unless one accepts MacKinnon’s 
implausible behavioristic approach to explaining why pornog­
raphy—but not other subordinating speech acts—plays a special 
role in the construction of social reality, one does not have 
nonarbitrary grounds for targeting pornography for regulation.
Perhaps the way to resolve this problem is to maintain that 
considerations of equality should prevail.76 After , all, no one is 
endorsing prior restraint. If those in positions of authority choose 
to produce and distribute images and words, sexually explicit or 
not, that subordinate or are clearly causally linked to harmful 
actions, then they should be prepared to suffer the consequences 
should they be sued. At the same time, depending on how the 
courts treated these cases, such a policy might have a "chilling 
effect" on speech that would be detrimental to everyone, including
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members of marginalized groups who are supposed to benefit from 
this restriction.7 In any case, MacKinnon’s core insight that social 
inequality is substantially created through words and images and 
symbols cannot be ignored. Her discussion exposes the naivete of 
the liberal view of speech as "only words" and has begun to shift 
the burden of proof toward those who would defend the right to 
perform subordinating speech acts.78
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